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Bismarck

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keep records, documents, or even a list of members. How the French are recounting the lost facts of the Resistance and chronicling the past from records that at first seem not to exist is an excellent example of ingenuity in historical research. Finally, Pulitzer Prize winner Barbara W. Tuchman, while discussing the problems in writing her biography of General Stilwell, found that the need to gain access to the Pentagon's classified material was overrated. In all cases but one, documents were declassified for her; and quite often she was able to establish the facts by simply going to a private source.

The most pertinent feature of this book, however, is the assistance it offers researchers in mining the wealth of material pertaining to the Second World War. The U.S. military heritage of World War II is richly documented, and this overabundance can be a problem for the researcher. For example, the National Archives has 164,000 cubic feet of military records from the years 1940-1945, which translate into some 670 million pages. Then the depositories of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have their own holdings. Add the files found in the Presidential libraries and all the microfilms on the subject of World War II and we have about 14,000 tons of military records. Needless to say the scholar can be overwhelmed; research on even a narrow topic is often mind-boggling. The archivists attempt to establish some semblance of order out of this chaos by describing where the records can be found, how to gain access to them, and how to use them. With this book at hand the researcher need no longer be intimidated by this vast supply of information.

Anyone who is entertaining thoughts of studying the primary sources of World War II should read this book. No doubt the war colleges and professional service schools will have a copy for their libraries. It is an indispensable source for the academician and the primary researcher of World War II.

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Palmer, Alan. Bismarck. New York: Scribner, 1976. 271pp.

Few individuals have been so extensively examined by biographers as Bismarck. Vilified by some, almost deified by others, Bismarck has been exhaustively and brilliantly portrayed by the likes of Eyck, Ludwig, and Pflanze. That after all this, a prominent author should still choose this subject for his latest study at first appears to be an exercise in superfluous repetition. And yet, Alan Palmer has produced a generally interesting and thoroughly solid biography. As the publisher's fly-cover proclaims with only slight exaggeration, this is genuinely a comprehensive biography of a formidably complex personality. In a remarkably compact account, Palmer has presented a factual synopsis, clear and accurate, of Bismarck's political and diplomatic career. Cleverly interwoven into this matrix is an attempt to give an account of Bismarck the man: "to dissect the myth and find the man behind the mask." Although new and dramatic revelations are not forthcoming, the combination spun by Palmer has resulted in a lucid and stimulating biography.

The book, however, is not without shortcomings. Because of the brevity of this account, it is impossible to get a good, appreciative feel for the guile and shrewdness with which Bismarck handled foreign policy. A sense of the finesse and precision in day-to-day maneuvers, dispatches and negotiations is missing, as is manifestation of the remarkable flexibility (often called opportunism) which characterized Bismarckian diplomacy in the face of each new development in a crisis. Obviously

this can only be fully achieved in a book of much greater length and detail, but even with restricted space, Palmer does not offer the reader much of a sample from which to appreciate Bismarck's skills.

In fact, rather than glorify his subject's talent, Palmer at times appears to go out of his way to minimize Bismarck's artistry and success. The account of the prelude to the Franco-Prussian War offers a vivid example. In July 1870, Bismarck intended to provoke France into an aggressive act against "the German people and so draw northern and southern Germany together in a national crusade . . . against the traditional enemy beyond the Rhine." The initial plan went awry and Palmer quickly proclaims: "Once again his [Bismarck's] calculations worked out badly." Yet the author is almost blase about the fact that 1 week after this "failure," France had in fact declared war on the Germans; that the resilience of the Iron Chancellor and his ability to adjust tactics to suit circumstances had garnered success from the impending setback. In short, the author can hardly be found guilty of hero-worship.

However, the most unfortunate aspect of the book is the undercurrent of personal censure one senses Palmer has toward his subject. It is not that he vilified Bismarck—evil can still hold fascination—but rather that he exhibits cold, unsympathetic disapproval of this subject. There is no hostility toward Bismarck, but neither is there enthusiasm. The effect is that sometimes Bismarck is flattened into a plastic character which dampens the readers' ardor for the book. Genuinely entertaining biographies are written by those who are fascinated by their subject.

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Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and Davis, Jacquelyn K. **The Cruise Missile: Bargaining Chip or Defense Bargain?** Cambridge: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1976. 53pp.

Many naval officers may view the development of cruise missiles by the U.S. Navy simply as a matter of catching up with the Soviets who have deployed such weapons for years—an opportunity to overcome longstanding disadvantages in standoff range. Aviators could well view these weapons as the lifesaving system which will permit target neutralization outside the range of an ever-worsening SAM defense. Submariners want cruise missiles to retain the utility of Polaris-firing SSBNs after Trident. Strategic planners see the SLCM as providing a survivable, precise second-strike capability. SALT negotiators would employ them (at worst) as a tradeoff against the Soviet Backfire medium bomber. Like the blind men touching the elephant, each has a different perspective of cruise missiles' form and mission.

In this concise, lucid and thorough miniature treatise, the authors examine today's U.S. cruise missile programs from each community's perspective, and objectively as a generic technology. They logically expand their writing to include reconnaissance, decoy, jamming and other nonwarhead missions. They also provide an excellent unclassified primer which is unique in the field including exposure to the new acronym vocabulary: ALCM, LLCM, SLCM, TALCM, TERCOM, SRAM, SCAD, CADM, RPV, etc.

Davis and Pfaltzgraff conclude that the cruise missile is far too capable a weapon to be merely a bargaining chip for SALT. The number of mobile platforms from which cruise missiles can be launched provides survivability; the missiles' low cost (quoted as one twentieth or less than that of a ballistic missile) encourages quantity buying; their low flight profile provides invul-